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NONPR OF I T E X E C UT I V E C OM PE NSA T I ON
By: Terri Lynn Helge and David M. Rosenberg 1

I.
Introduction. Excessive compensation paid to nonprofit executives and board members
is one of the key issues concerning charitable organizations that garner the attention of the
general public and Congress. Charitable organizations may pay reasonable compensation to their
directors, executive officers and employees for their services without violating applicable federal
tax law or state law. The determination of reasonable compensation depends on several factors –
the budget of the organization being the most significant factor. Other factors include the
number of employees of the organization, the particular sector of the charitable community
served by the organization, the geographic location of the organization, the focus of the
organization as being national or local, the length of the employee’s service and external market
forces.
Even if executive compensation is considered reasonable in light of the foregoing factors,
the perception that a charitable organization is paying excessive compensation can be damaging
to the organization’s reputation. Some nonprofit executive salaries have reached seven figures,
particularly in the larger health care systems and higher education. 2 In some cases, the highest
paid employee of a charitable organization is not its chief executive officer, but instead may be a
senior administrator or key physician of a large urban medical center, a key athletic coach at a
Division I university, or a chief investment officer of a university or foundation with a large
endowment. Reports of high nonprofit executive compensation have lead the Internal Revenue
Service to conduct an Executive Compensation Compliance Initiative in 2004 (with its findings
published in March 2007, discussed below), and the Internal Revenue Service continues to
scrutinize nonprofit executive compensation.
In addition, because nonprofit executive
compensation must be reported annually on the organization’s Form 990, the general public, the
media, and charity watchdog organizations also scrutinize nonprofit executive compensation.
Therefore, it is important for charitable organizations not only to understand the federal tax law
governing the payment of reasonable compensation to their directors, officers and key
employees, but also to understand their reporting obligations and best practices with respect to
executive compensation to avoid undue scrutiny.
II.
Prohibition on Private Inurement. Section 501(c)(3) of the Code 3 provides that no part
of the net earnings of an organization described therein may inure to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual. The Internal Revenue Service takes the position that any element of
private inurement can cause an organization to lose or be deprived of tax exemption, and that
there is no de minimus exception. 4 The private inurement prohibition contemplates a transaction
between a charitable organization and an individual in the nature of an “insider,” who is able to
cause application of the organization’s assets for private purposes because of his or her position. 5
In general, an organization’s directors, officers, members, founders and substantial contributors
are insiders. The meaning of the term “net earnings” in the private inurement context has been
largely framed by the courts. Most decisions reflect a pragmatic approach, rather than a literal
construction of the phrase “net earnings.” 6 Common transactions that may involve private
inurement include (i) excessive compensation for services; (ii) inflated or unreasonable rental
1
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prices; (iii) certain loan arrangements involving the assets of a charitable organization; (iv)
purchases of assets for more than fair market value; and (v) certain joint ventures with
commercial entities.
A.
Public Charities. In general, a charitable organization is presumed to be a private
foundation unless it can establish that it qualifies as a public charity under Sections 509(a)(1)–(3)
of the Code. Types of public charities described under Section 509(a)(1) of the Code include
churches, schools, hospitals, government entities and university endowment funds. 7 In addition,
an organization which normally receives more than one-third of its total support from
contributions from the general public is considered a public charity under Section 509(a)(1) of
the Code. 8 An organization which receives more than one-third of its total support from exempt
function revenues, such as admission fees to a museum or patient revenues for a hospital, is
considered a public charity under Section 509(a)(2) of the Code, provided the organization does
not normally receive more than one-third of its support from gross investment income. An
organization which does not meet either of these tests may still qualify as a public charity under
Section 509(a)(3) of the Code as a “supporting organization” of another public charity by virtue
of the relationship between the first organization and the second public charity.
B.
Excess Benefit Transactions. Section 4958 of the Code imposes an excise tax on
disqualified persons who engage in excess benefit transactions with public charities. 9 An
“excess benefit transaction” is any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by the
public charity directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person, if the value of the
economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of
services) received in exchange for such benefit. 10 The term “transaction” is used very generally
and includes a disqualified person’s use of a charitable organization’s property and services
provided to a disqualified person without adequate payment. Prototypical examples of excess
benefit transactions include paying excessive compensation to a director or officer or overpaying
a director or officer for property the director or officer sells to the charitable organization.
However, any direct or indirect benefit to a disqualified person may result in a violation of
Section 4958 if the disqualified person does not provide adequate consideration for the benefit.
When it applies, Section 4958 imposes an initial tax equal to 25% of the excess benefit
on any disqualified person. 11 A tax of 10% of the excess benefit is imposed on any organization
manager, i.e., any officer, director, or trustee of the organization, who knowingly participates in
the transaction. 12 The initial excise tax on organization managers is capped at $20,000. 13 If a
disqualified person engages in an excess benefit transaction with a public charity, corrective
action must be taken to essentially undo the excess benefit to the extent possible and to take any
additional measures to put the public charity in a financial position not worse than that in which
it would be if the disqualified person were dealing under the highest fiduciary standards. 14
C.
Disqualified Persons. The term “disqualified person” includes any person who
was, at any time during the 5-year period ending on the date of the transaction, in a position to
exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization. 15 Some persons, including
(but not limited to) board members, the president or chief executive officer, the treasurer or chief
financial officer, family members of such individuals, and entities in which such individuals own
35% of the interests, are automatically considered “disqualified.” 16
2
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Where a person is not automatically disqualified, all of the facts and circumstances will
generally be considered to determine if the person has substantial influence over the affairs of the
organization. 17 Factors tending to show that an individual exercises substantial influence
include:
i.

the individual is a founder of the organization;

ii.

the individual is a substantial contributor to the organization;

iii.
the individual’s compensation is primarily based on revenues derived from
activities of the organization, or of a particular department or function of the
organization, that the individual controls;
iv.
the individual has or shares authority to control or determine a substantial portion
of the organization’s capital expenditures, operating budget, or compensation for
employees;
v.
the individual manages a discrete segment or activity of the organization that
represents a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or expenses of the
organization, as compared to the organization as a whole; or
vi.
the individual owns a controlling interest (measured by either vote or value) in a
corporation, partnership, or trust that is a disqualified person. 18
Factors tending to show that an individual does not exercise substantial influence include:
i.
the individual has taken a bona fide vow of poverty as an employee, agent, or on
behalf, of a religious organization;
ii.
the individual is a contractor (such as an attorney, accountant, or investment
manager or advisor) whose sole relationship to the organization is providing professional
advice (without having decision-making authority) with respect to transactions from
which the individual will not economically benefit either directly or indirectly (aside
from customary fees received for the professional advice rendered);
iii.

the direct supervisor of the individual is not a disqualified person;

iv.
the individual does not participate in any management decisions affecting the
organization as a whole or a discrete segment or activity of the organization that
represents a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or expenses of the
organization, as compared to the organization as a whole; or
v.
any preferential treatment the individual receives based on the size of that
individual’s contribution is also offered to all other donors making a comparable

3
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contribution as part of a solicitation intended to attract a substantial number of
contributions. 19
1.
Exception for Non-Highly Compensated Employees. Nonetheless, an
employee who does not receive economic benefits from the organization in excess of the indexed
amount for being considered a highly compensated employee ($110,000 in 2011), 20 is not a
disqualified person even if the above factors indicate that the individual may have substantial
influence over the affairs of the organization. 21 This exception does not apply to employees who
are automatically considered disqualified or who are substantial contributors to the
organization. 22
2.
Initial Contract Exception. The theory behind the initial contract
exception is that an individual who negotiates an employment agreement in good faith before the
individual is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the organization should not be
subject to sanctions even if the compensation under the employment agreement turns out to be
excessive. Accordingly, Section 4958 does not apply to any fixed payment made to an
individual with respect to an initial contract, regardless of whether the payment would otherwise
constitute an excess benefit. 23 An “initial contract” is a binding written agreement between the
charitable organization and an individual who was not a disqualified person immediately before
entering into the agreement. 24 A “fixed payment” an amount of cash or other property specified
in the agreement, or determined by a specified objective fixed formula, which is to be paid or
transferred in exchange for the provision of specified services or property. 25 A fixed formula
may incorporate an amount that depends on future specified events or contingencies (such as the
amount of revenues generated by one or more activities of the organization), provided that no
person exercises discretion when calculating the amount of a payment or deciding whether to
make a payment. 26 If an initial contract provides for both fixed and non-fixed payments, the
fixed payments will not be subject to Section 4958 while the non-fixed payments will be
evaluated under an excess benefit transaction analysis, taking into account the individual’s entire
compensation package. 27
D.
What Constitutes Compensation? A disqualified person’s entire compensation
package must be evaluated to determine whether on the whole, the compensation received by the
individual is reasonable for the services provided. Accordingly, if the organization is relying on
the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness (discussed below), the organization’s board of
directors must consider and approve the disqualified person’s entire compensation package, not
merely salary and bonuses. The compensation package includes all forms of cash and noncash
compensation, all forms of deferred compensation if earned and vested, most fringe benefits
whether or not taxable, employer-paid premiums for liability insurance coverage, 28 expense
allowances and reimbursements, and other economic benefits received by the disqualified person
from the organization in exchange for the performance of services. 29 However, the following
benefits may be disregarded in evaluating the compensation package under Section 4958: (i)
employee fringe benefits that are excluded from gross income under Section 132; (ii) expense
reimbursements paid pursuant to an accountable plan; (iii) economic benefits provided to a
disqualified person solely as a member of or volunteer for the organization if the same benefit is
available to the general public in exchange for a membership fee of no more than $75 per year;
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and (iv) economic benefits provided to a disqualified person solely as a member of a charitable
class that the organization is organized to serve. 30
1.
Determination of Reasonable Compensation. In general, the value of
services is the amount that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises (whether
taxable or tax-exempt) under like circumstances (i.e., reasonable compensation). Section 162
standards apply in determining reasonableness of compensation, taking into account the
aggregate benefits (other than any benefits specifically disregarded under Treasury Regulation
Section 53.4958-4(a)(4)) provided to a person and the rate at which any deferred compensation
accrues. 31 The factors generally considered for purposes of Section 162 include (i) the
employee’s qualifications, (ii) the nature, extent and scope of the employee’s work, (iii) the size
and complexities of the employer’s business, (iv) the prevailing economic conditions, (v) the
prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable employers, and (vi) the
employer’s salary policy that applies to all employees. 32 The fact that bonus or revenue-sharing
arrangement is subject to a cap is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of
compensation. The fact that a state or local legislative or agency body or court has authorized or
approved a particular compensation package paid to a disqualified person is not determinative of
the reasonableness of compensation for purposes of Section 4958. 33
Normally, the facts and circumstances to be taken into consideration in
determining reasonableness of a fixed payment are those existing on the date the parties enter
into the agreement pursuant to which the payment is made. 34 However, in the event of
substantial non-performance, reasonableness is determined based on all facts and circumstances,
up to and including circumstances as of the date of payment. In the case of any payment that is
not a fixed payment under an agreement, reasonableness is determined based on all facts and
circumstances, up to and including circumstances as of the date of payment. 35
2.
Substantiation of Economic Benefit Treated as Compensation. To monitor
disguised compensation, the Treasury Regulations require a charitable organization to clearly
indicate its intent to treat an economic benefit as compensation when it is paid. This rule is
intended to prevent a charitable organization from later claiming that an excess benefit
transaction, such as a below-market loan or personal expense allowance, was actually
compensation and that the overall compensation package of the disqualified person was
reasonable. 36 To establish its intent, the organization must provide contemporaneous written
substantiation of the economic benefit intended to be compensation for services. 37
Contemporaneous written substantiation can be accomplished through the inclusion of the
economic benefit on the individual’s Form W-2 or Form 1099, through a written employment
agreement, or through the written contemporaneous documentation of the approved
compensation package under the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. 38 However, the
organization is not required to provide written substantiation of its intent to include nontaxable
economic benefits, such as employer-provided medical insurance or employer contributions to a
qualified retirement plan, as part of the individual’s compensation. 39 As a result, even though
contributions to qualified retirement plans and other nontaxable benefits are required to be taken
into account in evaluating whether the overall compensation package is reasonable, they are not
subject to the contemporaneous written substantiation requirement.
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3.
Revenue-sharing Compensation Arrangements.
Revenue-sharing
arrangements between a charitable organization and a disqualified person may be treated as an
excess benefit transaction if the transaction results in prohibited private inurement. 40 The scope
of this rule is uncertain and is not addressed in the final regulations. However, the implications
of this rule may be significant for performance-based compensation arrangements and more
complex arrangements to share revenue from intellectual property or other income-producing
activities.
After the enactment of Section 4958, proposed regulations were issued that
addressed the application of the excess benefit transaction rules to revenue-sharing compensation
arrangements. These rules were not incorporated into the final regulations, and the Internal
Revenue Service may later issue guidance in this area. In the meantime, revenue-sharing
compensation arrangements are evaluated under the general rules governing reasonableness of
compensation paid to a disqualified person, leaving a fog of uncertainty about whether these
arrangements are in fact reasonable.
Since the old proposed regulations provide the only guidance on this issue, they
are discussed herein for informational purposes, although they have no precedential value. In
general, whether a revenue-sharing arrangement constitutes an excess benefit transaction
depends on all relevant facts and circumstances. The arrangement may result in excess benefit if
it permits a disqualified person to receive additional compensation without providing
proportional benefits for the charitable organization. Relevant factors include the relationship
between the size of the benefit provided and the quality and quantity of the services provided,
and the ability of the disqualified person to control the activities generating the revenues. 41 The
proposed regulations provided three examples illustrating the principles for determining whether
a revenue-sharing transaction resulted in an excess benefit: 42
i.
In the first example, the disqualified person was an in-house investment
manager for the charitable organization. In addition to the individual’s regular salary and
benefits, the individual was entitled to a bonus equal to a percentage of any increase in the net
value of the portfolio. The bonus was considered an incentive to maximize benefits and
minimize expenses to the organization. Thus, even though the individual had a measure of
control over the portfolio performance, the bonus produced a proportional benefit for the
organization. Therefore, the revenue-sharing arrangement was not considered an excess benefit
transaction.
ii.
In the second example, the disqualified person was a third-party
management company managing the charitable organization’s charitable gaming activities. The
management company controlled all of the activities generating revenues and paid the charitable
organization a percentage of the net profits from these activities. Since the management
company provided all the personnel and equipment for the activities, the management company
controlled all the costs charged to revenues and net revenues. This structure did not provide the
management company with an appropriate incentive to maximize benefits and minimize costs to
the charitable organizations because the management company benefitted whether the net
revenues were low because expenses were high or net revenues were high because expenses
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were low. In contrast, the charitable organization only benefitted if the net revenues were high.
As a result, the entire transaction was considered an excess benefit transaction.
iii.
In the third example, the disqualified person was a university professor
who was the principal investigator in charge of certain scientific research. In addition to the
professor’s regular salary and benefits, the professor was entitled to a specified percentage of any
patent royalties on inventions produced by the professor’s research. This arrangement provided
an incentive for the professor to produce especially high quality work and no incentive to act
contrary to the university’s interest. Moreover, the university shared proportionately with the
professor. Lastly, the university owned and controlled the patent and the professor had no
control over the revenues generated from the patent. This arrangement was not considered an
excess benefit transaction. Many research institutions have invention and research policies
similar to this example.
E.
Rebuttable Presumption of Reasonableness. The Treasury Regulations provide
for a procedure, which if followed, creates a rebuttable presumption that a transaction between a
public charity and a disqualified person will not constitute an excess benefit transaction within
the meaning of Section 4958 of the Code. These procedures apply to fixed payments and, with
minor additional requirements, to non-fixed payments subject to a cap. 43 Legislative history
indicates that compensation arrangement or other financial transactions will be presumed to be
reasonable if the transaction arrangement was approved in advance by an independent board (or
an independent committee of the board) that was composed entirely of individuals unrelated to
and not subject to the control of the disqualified person, obtained and relied upon appropriate
data as to comparability, and adequately documented the basis for its determination. 44 The
Treasury Regulations read into the legislative history three distinct requirements: (1) approval by
an authorized body, (2) the appropriate data as to comparability, and (3) the documentation. 45
1.
Approval by an Authorized Body. The authorized body may be the Board
of Directors or a committee duly authorized under state law to act on behalf of the Board of
Directors. 46 A person is not considered part of the authorized body if he merely meets to provide
information to the board and then recuses himself. 47 No person voting on the matter may have a
conflict of interest with respect to the transaction. 48 A member of the authorized body does not
have a conflict of interest if the member:
i.
is not the disqualified person or related to any disqualified person
who benefits from the transaction;
ii.
is not employed by or controlled by any disqualified person
benefiting from the transaction;
iii.
is not receiving compensation or other payments from a
disqualified person benefiting from the transaction;
iv.
has no material financial interest affected by the compensation
arrangement or transaction; and
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v.
does not approve a transaction providing economic benefits to any
disqualified person participating in the compensation arrangement or transaction, who
in turn has approved or will approve a transaction providing economic benefits to the
member. 49
2.
Appropriate Data as to Comparability. The authorized body must have
sufficient information to determine whether a compensation arrangement or other transaction
will result in the payment of reasonable compensation or a transaction for fair value. Relevant
information includes, but is not limited to:
i.
compensation levels paid by other similarly-situated organizations
(taxable or tax-exempt);
ii.

availability of similar services in the applicable geographic area;

iii.

independent compensation surveys;

iv.
of the person;
v.

written offers from similar institutions competing for the services

independent appraisals of all property to be transferred; or

vi.
offers for property received as part of an open and competitive
50
bidding process.
3.
Documentation. For the decision to be adequately documented, the
records of the authorized body must note:
i.

the terms of the transaction and the date it was approved;

ii.
the members of the authorized body who were present during the
debate on the transaction or arrangement and those who voted on it;
iii.
was obtained;

the comparability data obtained and relied upon and how the data

iv.
the actions taken with respect to consideration of the transaction by
anyone who is otherwise a member of the authorized body but who had a conflict of
interest with respect to the transaction; and
v.
obtained.

the basis for any deviation from the range of comparable data

51

Moreover, such records must be prepared by the next meeting of the authorized
body (or within 60 days after the final action of the authorized body, if later than the next
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meeting) and must be reviewed and approved as reasonable, accurate and complete within a
reasonable time period thereafter. 52
III.

Best Practices for Executive Compensation.

A.
Internal Revenue Service Executive Compensation Compliance Initiative. The
Internal Revenue Service has devoted substantial time and attention to executive compensation
paid by nonprofit organizations. In August 2004, the Internal Revenue Service announced that it
would conduct a Compensation Compliance Initiative aimed at identifying and stopping abuses
by nonprofit organizations that pay excessive compensation to their directors, officers and key
employees. The Compensation Compliance Initiative involved Internal Revenue Service contact
of over 1,800 public charities and private foundations, seeking information about their
compensation practices and procedures. In March 2007, the Internal Revenue Service issued a
report summarizing the results of its Compensation Compliance Initiative. 53 In its report, the
Internal Revenue Service made the following points:
1.
There were significant reporting issues with respect to executive
compensation. Over thirty percent of the organizations had to amend their Form 990 and
approximately fifteen percent of the organizations were selected for examination.
2.
Examinations primarily showed problems with reporting, rather than other
concerns. However, the Internal Revenue Service cautioned that this was not a statistical
sample, so no definitive statement could be made about the level of compliance in the area of
executive compensation. The Internal Revenue Service will conduct continued work with
respect to executive compensation.
3.
Where problems were discovered, the Internal Revenue Service made
large assessments of excise taxes with respect to excess compensation – 25 examinations of
40 disqualified persons or organizations managers have resulted in proposed excise tax
assessments in excess of $21 million.
4.
While high compensation amounts were found in many cases, they
generally were substantiated with appropriate comparability data.
Prior to the release of the final report on the Compensation Compliance Initiative, the
Internal Revenue Service conducted an Executive Compensation Phone Forum in May 2006 to
discuss the issues which emerged from the Compensation Compliance Initiative. 54 The Phone
Forum provided an interesting view of the Internal Revenue Service’s thoughts on nonprofit
executive compensation. In particular, Internal Revenue Service representatives suggested that
nonprofit organizations should focus their attention on the following best practices:
1.
Legal Protection. According to the Internal Revenue Service representatives
“every board should consider meeting the requirements of the rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness.”

9
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2.
Timely Reporting and Disclosure. All economic benefits to directors, officers and
key employees should be reported timely on the organization’s Form 990. If an
organization does not clearly indicate its intent to treat an economic benefit provided to an
officer, director or key employee as compensation for services, it will automatically be
treated as an excess benefit transaction. Accordingly, organizations that fail to report
“fringe benefit perks” like personal use of an automobile of reimbursement of personal
expenses will subject the disqualified person to an automatic 25% excise tax on the amount
of the fringe benefit as an automatic excess benefit transaction.
Transparency.
While many charitable organizations have compensation
3.
committees that are given the authority to evaluate and approve executive compensation, the
full board still has the ultimate responsibility over executive compensation matters.
Therefore, to the extent appropriate, executive compensation matters decided by a
committee of the board should be reported to the full board. The level of oversight by the
full board may vary depending on the type and size of the organization, but there should be
a system in place to ensure that the full board is aware of the most important compensation
matters within the organization. The Internal Revenue Service representatives on the Phone
Forum indicated there are specific problem areas that “frequently fall through the cracks.”
In particular, personal components of business travel, personal use of employer-owned
property, gifts and gift certificates, tax gross-ups, expense reimbursements outside corporate
travel policies, spouse travel expenses, non-accountable expense allowances, and club
memberships, are additional perks that some nonprofit executive receive and should be
considered as part of the overall compensation package. However, these items may not be
disclosed to the board or the committee of the board making compensation determinations.
B.
Panel on the Nonprofit Sector Recommendations. Over the past several years, the
Senate Finance Committee has scrutinized the compensation practices of charitable
organizations. While no legislation affecting compensation of nonprofit executives has been
proposed, the staff of the Senate Finance Committee released a discussion draft on proposed
reforms and best practices in the charitable community in June 2004 that may still be considered
for future proposed legislation. 55 At the prompting of the Senate Finance Committee, an
independent nonprofit organization, the Independent Sector, convened the Panel on the
Nonprofit Sector (the “Panel”) to study the proposals in the discussion draft and make
recommendations with respect to the reforms needed in the charitable community. The result
was the issuance of the Panel’s final report “Strengthening Transparency Governance
Accountability of Charitable Organizations” in June 2005. 56 Most recently, the Panel issued a
draft “Principles for Effective Practice,” which are a series of voluntary best practices standards
for effective governance of charitable organizations. 57
1.
Compensation of Individuals Serving the Organization in a Dual Capacity.
Under current law, there is no prohibition on directors of a charitable organization receiving
compensation from the organization for their services to the organization in some other capacity.
However, the Senate Finance Committee staff discussion draft contained proposals that would
limit the ability of a director of a charitable organization to receive compensation from the
organization in some other capacity. In particular, the proposals would allow only one member
of the board to receive compensation from the organization, and such individual could not serve
10
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as chair or treasurer of the organization. Similarly, in its recommended “Principles for Effective
Practice,” the Panel advocates separation of the paid chief executive officer and the treasurer and
the chair of the charitable organization as an essential good governance practice. The Panel’s
rationale for this principle is as follows:
Concentrating authority for the organization’s governance and management practices in
one or two individuals removes valuable checks and balances that help ensure that
conflicts of interest and other personal concerns do not take precedence over the best
interests of the organization. Both the board chair and the treasurer should be independent
of the chief staff executive to provide appropriate oversight of the executive’s
performance and to make fair and impartial judgments about the appropriate
compensation of the executive. When the board deems it is in the best interests of the
charitable organization to have the chief executive officer/executive director serve as the
board chair, the board should appoint another board member (sometimes referred to as
the “lead director”) to handle issues that require a separation of duties. For example, the
lead director would serve as chair for deliberations involving the responsibilities,
performance or compensation of the chief executive officer/executive director.
In addition, the Panel advocates that a “substantial majority” of the directors of a
charitable organization not be compensated for their services to the organization in any capacity
other than as directors of the organization. The Panel reasons “[w]hen a majority of the board
members are free of the conflicts of interest that can arise from having a personal interest in the
financial transactions of the charity, the board as a whole may be more likely to exercise its
responsibility to review and take action on materials and information independent of the staff
management.” Accordingly, if a director of the charitable organization receives compensation
for services to the organization in some other capacity, it is essential that the composition of the
board be large enough so that the compensated individual does not unduly influence the board’s
decisions.
2.
Compensation of the Chief Executive Officer. The Panel advocates that
the board annually evaluate the performance of the chief executive officer prior to any change in
that officer’s compensation, unless there is a multi-year contract in force or the change consists
solely of routine cost of living adjustments. The Panel considers the selection, evaluation and
determination of compensation of the chief executive officer of the organization as one of the
most important responsibilities of the board. Accordingly, the Panel recommends that the full
board approve the compensation of the chief executive officer annually. Although delegation of
chief executive officer compensation decisions to a compensation committee of the board is not
recommended, the Panel provides that “[i]f the board designates a separate committee to review
the compensation and performance of the CEO, that committee should be required to report its
findings and recommendations to the full board for approval and should provide any board
member with details, upon request. The board should then document the basis for its decision
and be prepared to answer questions about it.” Therefore, even though the rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness would allow approval of the chief executive officer’s
compensation by a duly authorized committee of the board, the Panel does not recommend that
the final approval rest with a committee. Even if a charitable organization does leave the
approval of the chief executive officer’s compensation to a duly authorized compensation
11
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committee, the committee should report the basis for its approval to the full board in a timely
manner.
3.
Compensation of Other Officers and Key Employees. As for the
compensation of other officers and key employees, the determination of the amount of
compensation is normally delegated to the chief executive officer. However, the Panel
recommends that the board approve “the compensation range of other persons in a position to
exercise substantial control of the organization’s resources. It is the responsibility of the CEO to
hire and set the compensation of other staff, consistent with reasonable compensation guidelines
set by the board. If the CEO finds it necessary to offer compensation that equals or surpasses his
or her own, in order to attract and retain certain highly qualified and experienced staff, the board
should review the compensation package to ascertain that it does not provide an excess benefit.”
IV.

Special Rules Applicable to Supporting Organizations and Donor Advised Funds.

A.
Supporting Organizations. Organizations that support a public charity are
allowed public charity status if they meet certain requirements.
These “supporting
organizations” are grouped into three types: (i) those that are “operated, supervised, or
controlled by” the public charity they support (Type I); (ii) those that are “supervised or
controlled in connection with” the public charity they support (Type II); and (iii) those that are
“operated in connection with” the public charity they support (Type III). 58 Type III supporting
organizations are further divided into functionally integrated Type III supporting organizations
and other Type III supporting organizations. A functionally integrated Type III supporting
organization 59 is defined as a Type III supporting organization that is not required to make
payments to the supported organizations due to the supporting organization’s activities being
related to performing the functions of, or carrying out the purposes of, such supported
organizations. 60
Enacted on August 17, 2006, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 61 (the “PPA”) contains
many reforms for supporting organizations and donor advised funds (discussed below). In
particular, if an individual or entity is a disqualified person with respect to a supporting
organization, such individual or entity is automatically a disqualified person with respect to the
supported organization(s) as well. 62 Accordingly, transactions between such individual or entity
and the supported organization must be analyzed under the excess benefit transaction rules of
Section 4958 of the Code. In addition, all types of supporting organizations are prohibited from
making grants, loans, compensation or similar payments 63 to a substantial contributor of the
supporting organization or a person related to a substantial contributor. 64 Similarly, all loans to
disqualified persons of the supporting organization are prohibited. 65 The prohibitions do not
apply if the substantial contributor or disqualified person is a public charity (other than another
supporting organization). If a prohibited payment is made, the substantial contributor is treated
as a disqualified person and the entire amount of the payment is treated as an excess benefit
transaction under Section 4958(c) of the Code.
B.
Donor Advised Funds. Donor advised funds are generally funds owned by a
public charity in which a donor is able to make non-binding recommendations as to their
management and investment. The charity remains in control over the use of the funds and is free
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to disregard the advice of the donor. Because the donor is able to influence how the funds are
used, there is concern that donor advised funds are being abused in various ways. The PPA adds
Sections 4966 and 4967 to the Code which is designed to improve the accountability of donor
advised funds.
1.
Definitions. Section 4966(d) of the Code contains four important
definitions, including a statutory definition of donor advised funds:
a.
Sponsoring Organization: A Sponsoring Organization is any
charitable organization that is not a private foundation and that maintains one or more Donor
Advised Funds. 66
b.
Donor Advised Fund: The term “donor advised fund” means a
fund or account: (1) that is separately identified by reference to contributions of a donor or
donors; 67 (2) that is owned and controlled by a Sponsoring Organization; and (3) with respect to
which a donor, or the donor’s designee has, or reasonably expects to have, advisory privileges 68
regarding the distribution or investment of any amounts held in the fund. 69 However, the term
“donor advised fund” does not include a fund or account from which grants to individuals for
travel, study or similar purposes are made as long as (a) the donor’s advisory privileges are
performed exclusively by such donor in his capacity as a member of a committee appointed by
the Sponsoring Organization, (b) no combination of a donor and persons related to or appointed
by such donor control such committee, and (c) all grants from such funds satisfy the
requirements applicable to private foundations under Section 4945(g) with respect to grants
made for travel, study or similar purposes. 70 In addition, a fund which benefits a single
identified organization or governmental entity is exempted from treatment as a Donor Advised
Fund. 71 Furthermore, the Secretary of the Treasury (the “Secretary”) may exempt from
treatment as a Donor Advised Fund a fund which is advised by a committee not controlled by a
donor, donor advisor or related persons or which is designed to benefit a single identified
charitable purpose. In Notice 2006-109, the Internal Revenue Service determined that employersponsored disaster relief funds are excluded from treatment as Donor Advised Funds, provided
certain requirements are met. 72
c.
Fund Manager: A Fund Manager is any officer, trustee, or director
of a Sponsoring Organization and, with respect to a specific act or failure to act, the employees
of the Sponsoring Organization having authority or responsibility with respect to such act or
failure to act. 73
d.
Disqualified Supporting Organization: A Disqualified Supporting
Organization is (1) any Type III supporting organization that is not a functionally integrated
Type III supporting organization, (2) any Type I, Type II or functionally integrated Type III
supporting organization over which a donor or donor appointee who advises regarding
distributions from a Donor Advised Fund to such organization has direct or indirect control, or
(3) any other supporting organization that the Secretary determines by regulation to be a
Disqualified Supporting Organization. 74
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2.
Inappropriate Donor Benefits. In order to combat abuses where donors are
inappropriately benefiting from Donor Advised Fund assets, the PPA imposes several reforms.
First, Section 4966 of the Code prohibits distributions from a Donor Advised Fund to
individuals. Second, donors, donor advisors, and investment advisors to Donor Advised Funds
are automatically treated as disqualified persons with respect to the Sponsoring Organization for
purposes of Section 4958(f) of the Code. 75 Accordingly, transactions between these persons and
the Sponsoring Organization are subject to the excess benefit transaction rules contained in
Section 4958 of the Code. In addition, the definition of “excess benefit transaction” is amended
to include any grant, loan, compensation or similar payment 76 from a Donor Advised Fund to a
person who is a donor, donor advisor, or related person. 77 The entire amount of any such grant,
loan, compensation or similar payment is treated as an “excess benefit” subject to the tax,
regardless of whether the terms of the payment are reasonable. Finally, if a donor, donor
advisor, or related person receives, directly or indirectly, a benefit as a result of a distribution
from a Donor Advised Fund, and such benefit is more than incidental, Section 4967 of the Code
would impose excise taxes of 125% of the more than incidental benefit 78 on the donor or donor
advisor who recommended the distribution and on the recipient of the benefit. 79 An excise tax of
10% of the more than incidental benefit is also imposed on Fund Managers who approved the
distribution.80 There is no exception for Fund Managers acting not willfully and due to
reasonable cause. No tax will be imposed under Code Section 4967 if a tax has been imposed
under Code Section 4958 with respect to the distribution. 81
V.

Reporting Compensation on Form 990

Key Thresholds and Definitions. Thresholds vary for purposes of reporting
A.
names and compensation on Form 990 as follows:
Director or Trustee. All voting directors and trustees of a charitable
1.
organization are reported on Form 990 without regard to compensation.
2.
Officer. All officers of a charitable organization are reported without
regard to compensation.
3.
Key Employee. A key employee is reported on Form 990 only if the
employee’s compensation exceeds $150,000 and the employee (a) has responsibilities, powers or
influence over the organization similar to those of officers, directors or trustees, (b) manages a
discrete segment or activity of the organization that represents at least 10% of the assets, income
or expenses of the organization, or (c) has or shares authority to control or determine at least
10% of the organization’s capital expenditures, operating budget or employee compensation.
4.
Highest Compensated Employees. An organization’s highest compensated
employees include its other employees whose compensation exceeds $100,000. Only the top
five highest compensated employees are reported on Form 990.
5.

ODTKEs.

ODTKEs include officers, directors, trustees and key

employees.
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6.
Family Member / Family Relationship. For purposes of Form 990
reporting, a family member includes an individual’s spouse, ancestors, siblings (whole or half),
children (natural or adopted), grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and spouses of siblings,
children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren.
B.
Part VI – Line 15; Rebuttable Presumption of Reasonableness. Line 15 of Part VI
asks “[d]id the process for determining compensation of the CEO/Executive Director/top
management official and other officers or key employees of the organization include a review
and approval by independent persons, comparability data, and contemporaneous substantiation of
the deliberation and decision?” Essentially, the organization is asked to describe if and how it
establishes a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness for compensation paid to the listed
individuals. Schedule O must include a description sufficient to evidence that the organization
takes appropriate steps to avoid the payment of “excess benefits” that could be taxable to the
recipient and managers under Section 4958 of the Code. A clue to the desired elements of the
compensation determination process is found in Schedule J, Part 1, Line 3, which lists the
following components: compensation committee, independent compensation consultant, Form
990s of other organizations, written employment contracts, compensation surveys, and approval
by the governing board or compensation committee.
C.
Part VII – ODTKEs and Highest Compensated Employees. All compensation
paid to ODTKEs and highly compensated employees must be reported in Part VII. For purposes
of Part VII, a person with any voting power at any time during the year, whether compensated or
not, is considered a director or trustee and must be listed. If the membership of the board
changes during the year, there will be more directors listed than the number that served at any
one time, and all of them will be listed as “current” members of the board per the Form 990
instructions. Officers include anyone with top administrative and financial duties without regard
to designation or title.
One objective of the Form 990 redesign with respect to compensation reporting was to
gain the ability to compare similar organizations with different tax years. Thus, compensation for
all organizations is reported on a calendar year basis as reflected on Forms W-2 or 1099. The
following compensation must be reported for the individuals required to be listed in Part VII
regardless of amount: (i) salaries and bonuses; (ii) employer contributions to defined benefit
retirement plans; (iii) tax deferred employer and employee contributions to qualified defined
contribution retirement plans; (iv) increase in the actuarial value of a qualified or nonqualified
defined benefit plan, whether or not the plan is funded, vested or subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture; (v) increase in the value of a deferred compensation plan, whether or not vested or
paid to the employee; and (vi) the value of health benefits provided by the employer that are not
reported as part of reportable compensation, such as health insurance premiums, medical
reimbursement, flexible spending plan contributions, and the value of health coverage provided
by an employer’s self-insured or self-funded health plan. Other compensation, such as
compensation from a related organization and other reportable employee benefits (e.g.,
automobile allowances, life insurance, tuition assistance, dependent care assistance, disability
insurance and club dues), must be reported if it exceeds $10,000 per item. 82
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Reporting difficulties with Part VII stem primarily from payments made by affiliated
organizations, outside management companies, and common paymasters, including how to
obtain the proper information and what to report. For example, Organization A serves as
common paymaster for itself and Organization B, a related entity. Officer M works 75% of her
time for A and 25% for B. One hundred percent of M’s compensation is reported on the returns
for both organizations. Thus, a person reading both organizations’ Forms 990 may conclude that
Officer M received more compensation than was actually paid due to the requirement to report
the same compensation on both returns. The organizations can alleviate this misperception of
excessive compensation by including a statement on Schedule O of both returns that describes
the allocation of Officer M’s compensation between the two organizations and that explains the
same compensation is required to be reported on both returns.
D.
Schedule J – Compensation Information for Certain ODTKEs and Highest
Compensated Employees. Schedule J requires an organization to report additional detailed
information regarding the compensation paid to certain ODTKEs and highest compensated
employees. An organization is required to complete Schedule J if it meets any of the following
requirements: (i) the organization is required to list any former ODTKE or highest compensated
employees in Part VII; (ii) the sum of reportable compensation and other compensation paid to
any individual listed in Part VII exceeds $150,000; or (iii) the organization participated in an
arrangement in which an unrelated organization paid compensation to one of its ODTKEs or
highest compensated employees for services performed for the filing organization. If an
organization is required to file Schedule J, the organization only needs to report on Schedule J
the individuals that satisfy one of the three threshold requirements; other ODTKEs and highest
compensated employees are not required to be reported on Schedule J.
Part I contains questions regarding the organization’s executive compensation practices
and policies. Line 3 asks about the method for determining compensation for the organization’s
chief executive officer. Like line 15 in Part VI of the core form, the question seeks to determine
if the organization is following the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness procedures in
determining the CEO’s compensation. All other questions in Part I relate to the organization’s
compensation practices and policies with respect to all of its ODTKEs and highest compensated
employees reported in Part VII, even if the details of the compensation paid to some of those
individuals are not required to be reported on Schedule J. Line 4 asks whether any of the
reported individuals received a severance or change of control payment, participated in a
supplemental nonqualified retirement plan, or participated in an equity-based compensation
arrangement. If so, the details of the arrangement must be described in Part III of Schedule J. In
particular, the Internal Revenue Service is likely to scrutinize severance payments and equitybased compensation arrangements for potential excess benefit. The Internal Revenue Service is
suspicious of any compensation that does not have a fixed amount or value. Therefore, lines 5,
6, and 7 ask whether the organization has paid any non-fixed payments to or participates in
revenue-sharing arrangements with its ODTKEs and highest compensated employees. If so, the
details of the arrangement must be reported in Part III of Schedule J.
E.
Schedule L – Relationships. This schedule should be considered hand-in hand
with responses provided in the governance portion of Part VI of Form 990. The completion of
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Schedule L is made more complicated by the fact that the four separate parts each have a
different definition of the term “interested person.”
Part I requires disclosure of impermissible excess benefits with disqualified persons, which
are subject to the intermediate sanctions penalties under Section 4958 of the Code and required
to be reported on Form 4720. Coordination of the information provided in Line 15 of Part VI and
Lines 1-8 of Schedule J, Part I (relating to compensation), is prudent.
Part II reports loans to or from interested persons that are outstanding at the end of the year,
regardless of whether the loans constitute excess benefit transactions under Section 4958. Loans
for this purpose include salary and other advances and receivables. Interested persons include
current and former ODTKEs listed in Part VII, Section A, highest compensated employees, and
disqualified persons as defined in Section 4958 of the Code. Even though loans to or from
interested persons may be permissible, the Internal Revenue Service, the Panel on the Nonprofit
Sector and charity watchdog groups all view interested person loans with great skepticism.
Part III reports grants or assistance benefiting interested persons. Interested persons for this
purpose include current and former ODTKEs listed in Part VII, Section A, substantial
contributors, and family members and 35% controlled entities of any of the foregoing. The
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE has stipulated that grants paid to an interested person who is
a member of the charitable class which the grant is intended to benefit in furtherance of the
organization’s exempt purpose, such as disaster relief or trauma counseling, need not be
reported. Grants to enhance one’s literary, artistic or other skills are reportable. The names of
interested person grantees receiving funding for study or travel or for achievement awards must
be included. Schools that award scholarships are not required to identify interested persons who
receive grants.
Part IV identifies reportable business transactions for which payments were made between
the organization and an interested person during the tax year. The definition of interested person
is broad and includes current and former ODTKEs listed on Part VII, Section A, family members
or 35% controlled entities of any ODTKEs, or an entity (other than an exempt organization
described in Section 501(c) of the Code or a governmental unit or instrumentality) of which a
current or former ODTKE listed in Form 990, Part VII, Section A was serving at the time of the
transaction as (1) an officer, (2) a director, (3) a trustee, (4) a key employee, (5) a partner or
member with a direct or indirect ownership interest in excess of 5% (including ownership by a
family member) if the entity is treated as a partnership, or (6) a shareholder with a direct or
indirect ownership interest in excess of 5% (including ownership by a family member) if the
entity is a professional corporation. Business transactions include contracts of sale, lease, license,
and performance of services and also joint ventures in which the interest of the organization and
of the interested person each exceeds 10%. Business transactions with interested persons are
reportable if: (1) all payments during the tax year between the organization and interested person
exceeded $100,000, (2) all payments from a single transaction between the organization and
interested person exceeded the greater of $10,000 or 1% of the organization’s total revenues, (3)
compensation payments by the organization to a family member of certain persons exceeded
$10,000, or (4) in the case of a joint venture with an interested person, the organization has
invested $10,000 or more.
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VI.
Texas Law Related to Nonprofit Executive Compensation. Texas law is similar to
federal tax law regarding compensation of officers and directors of a nonprofit organization. The
Texas Nonprofit Corporation Law (TNCL) allows nonprofit corporations to “pay compensation
in a reasonable amount to its . . . directors and officers for services rendered.” 83
A.
Role of the Board of Directors. Typically, Texas nonprofit corporations are
managed by a board of directors (sometimes called the board of trustees). Texas law requires a
minimum of three directors of a nonprofit corporation. 84 The board of directors is ultimately
responsible for the oversight of the nonprofit corporation. The board of directors elects the
officers of the nonprofit corporation who are responsible for the day to day management of the
corporation. 85
B.
Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors. The fiduciary standards applicable to
charitable directors include the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the duty of obedience.
1.
Duty of Care. All nonprofit directors are subject to a duty of care. The
duty of care requires a nonprofit director to discharge his responsibilities in good faith, with the
care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances, and in a manner the director reasonably believes is in the best interests of the
organization. 86 The degree of skill required is that of the ordinary prudent person, that is, the
basic directorial attributes of common sense, practical wisdom, and informed judgment. If a
director has special expertise, such as accounting, legal or investment expertise, then that director
must exercise the degree of skill that a prudent person with similar expertise would exercise in
the same or similar circumstances. The duty of care also requires that directors make decisions
they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation. 87
A director can fail to discharge the duty of care in two ways: by failing to supervise or by
failing to make an informed decision. Adequate supervision means that the director actively
participates in the charity’s governance, such as by regularly attending board meetings,
reviewing minutes and other materials disseminated to board members, meeting periodically
with senior management, periodically reviewing the charity’s financial statements and annual
information returns (IRS Form 990), and asking questions of outside experts such as consultants,
accountants and attorneys when appropriate. To make an informed decision, a director must be
adequately informed about the material aspects of a proposed transaction before approving it. In
discharging the duty of care, a director may rely in good faith on information, opinions, reports
or statements concerning the corporation that was prepared or presented by officers, employees,
a committee of the board of which the director is not a member, or outside professional advisors
to the corporation (e.g., auditors, legal advisors, and investment advisors). 88 Thus, directors
should be aware of the compensation paid to the organization’s officers and the method used to
determine the officers’ compensation. If the director is serving on a compensation committee (or
if approval of officer compensation is done by the entire board), then the director should review
all relevant materials related to the compensation decision prior to the meeting and ask relevant
questions of any compensation consultant retained by the organization.
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The business judgment rule protects nonprofit directors by providing that directors will not
be liable for harm to the corporation for the exercise of their judgment so long as they exercised
care in the decision making process. Thus more than simple negligence on the part of the
director is required to hold the director liable for a breach of the duty of care. The business
judgment rule applies only in the absence of fraud, illegality or a disabling conflict of interest. In
summary, the duty of care relates to the decision-making process. If a nonprofit director acts in
good faith and satisfies the requisite standard of care, a court generally will not review the action,
even if it proves disastrous to the charity. Accordingly, compliance with the duty of care
protects a nonprofit director from liability for decisions that, with the benefit of hindsight, turn
out to be wrong.
2.
Duty of Loyalty. To satisfy the duty of loyalty, a nonprofit director must
act in the best interests of the corporation, but does not need to avoid personal gain at all costs.
In the nonprofit corporate setting, a conflict-of-interest or self-dealing transaction is not flatly
prohibited, but should be carefully scrutinized. The only exception is a blanket prohibition on
loans to directors of a nonprofit corporation; any director who votes for or assents to the making
of the loan is jointly liable for the amount of the loan until it is repaid. 89 Before engaging in a
self-dealing or conflict-of-interest transaction with a charitable organization (including payment
of compensation to the director in the director’s capacity as an officer of the organization), the
director should disclose all material facts relating to his personal interest in the transaction to the
board of directors or a committee of the board comprised of disinterested directors, and a
majority of disinterested directors or committee members should approve the transaction only
after concluding that it is fair and reasonable to the charity. 90 If this procedure is followed, then
the transaction is not void or voidable solely because of the director’s interest in the transaction.
If the transaction occurred prior to obtaining approval from a majority of disinterested directors,
then the transaction may be ratified by a majority of disinterested directors or a committee of the
board comprised of disinterested directors provided the transaction is fair to the nonprofit
corporation. A breach of the duty of loyalty not only gives rise to a tort claim under state law,
but may also implicate penalties under federal tax law as an excess benefit transaction.
3.
Duty of Obedience. The duty of obedience requires a director to adhere to
the governing documents of the organization and to faithfully adhere to its mission, and to follow
restrictions imposed by donors on contributions of charitable funds. Essentially, the duty of
obedience requires directors and trustees to refrain from transactions and activities that are ultra
vires. Thus, a director must carefully review the governing documents of the organization and
adhere to any provisions in the governing documents addressing the compensation of the
organization’s directors and officers.
4.
Limitation of Liability. Texas law allows for a nonprofit corporation to
limit the liability of its directors to the organization or its members for monetary damages for an
act or omission by the director in the person’s capacity as a director by including appropriate
provisions in its certificate of formation. 91 However, the elimination or limitation of the liability
of a director is not allowed to the extent the person is found liable under applicable law for: (1) a
breach of the director’s duty of loyalty; (2) an act or omission not in good faith that: (A)
constitutes a breach of duty of the director to the organization; or (B) involves intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (3) a transaction from which the director received an
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improper benefit, regardless of whether the benefit resulted from an action taken within the
scope of the director’s duties; or (4) an act or omission for which the liability of a director is
expressly provided by an applicable statute. 92
C.
Enforcement by the Texas Attorney General. Officers and directors who breach
their fiduciary duties to the nonprofit corporation may be held liable to the nonprofit corporation
for the resulting damages to the corporation. Generally, the Texas Attorney General is vested
with the authority to investigate and enforce potential breaches of fiduciary duties by nonprofit
officers and directors. While the enforcement of excessive compensation paid to nonprofit
directors and officers in Texas by the Texas Attorney General is not common, it has been
successfully done.
Most recently, the Texas Attorney General brought suit against several directors of the
Carl B. and Florence E. King Foundation seeking to recover excessive compensation paid to the
officers. 93 The King Foundation was established in 1966 by oilman Carl B. King and his wife,
Florence E. King. The primary defendant in the case, Carl L. Yeckel, is the Kings’ grandson.
Yeckel was elected to the King Foundation’s board of directors in 1971. At the time, Florence
King was the board’s president. Thereafter, in 1975, Yeckel accepted full-time employment with
the King Foundation for an annual salary of $24,000. Yeckel was elected president of the King
Foundation in 1993, after the death of both his grandparents. On October 6, 1994, during his first
year as Foundation president, Yeckel sent a memorandum to the board proposing raises for
himself and the King Foundation’s two other employees, Thomas Vett, the corporate secretary
and accountant, and office staffer Carolyn Mott. In the memo, Yeckel advised the board that his
annual salary as of that date was $220,800, that Vett’s salary was $120,700, and that Mott’s
salary was $75,500. Yeckel proposed a four percent fixed salary increase for each employee plus
“a possible merit scale of 0 - 4%,” effective as of June 1, 1994. Yeckel further stated that the
King Foundation’s practice had been to increase or adjust salaries each April 1, and justified the
raises he proposed as necessary to correct a “twenty month oversight” in making those annual
adjustments. Yeckel’s memo prompted at least one of the King Foundation’s board members to
raise concerns that the salary levels were high compared to comparable foundations--between
seventeen and sixty-five percent higher, the board member claimed--and could create problems
with the Internal Revenue Service. Similar concerns were raised by the accountant who prepared
the King Foundation’s tax returns.
In the years that followed, Yeckel did not again disclose employee salaries to the King
Foundation’s board, although this information was included in the Foundation’s annual tax
returns. Yeckel was able to set his own compensation and that of Vett and Mott, without board
approval. He steadily increased his compensation during each year of his presidency between
twenty and twenty-six percent each year from 1996 through 2000, while awarding Vett annual
increases of between nineteen and twenty-two percent. By 2002, Yeckel’s annual salary was
$974,978, Vett’s was $451,937, and Mott’s was $141,622, not counting benefits. In addition, a
separate bank account was established from which the salaries of Yeckel and Vett were paid, and
no one other than Yeckel and Vett saw the checks written on that account. Board members were
unaware of the continued increases in Yeckel’s compensation after 1994 and of various benefits
that Yeckel provided to himself using Foundation funds, including use of vehicles, private club
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memberships, payment of all unreimbursed health expenses for himself and his family, and use
of Foundation credit cards for personal charges that were not required to be reimbursed.
In August 2002, after receiving a complaint from Yeckel’s sister, the Texas Attorney
General sued the King Foundation, Yeckel, Vett, and other directors to protect the public interest
in the administration of charitable assets held by the King Foundation. The suit asserted claims
against Yeckel, Vett and other officers and directors of the King Foundation for breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion, conspiracy to commit fraud, and violation of the Texas Non-Profit
Corporation Act. Subsequently, Yeckel resigned from the King Foundation, each of the other
members of the five-member board either resigned or was removed, and Vett was terminated.
With a new board of directors in control, the Texas Attorney General dropped its suit against the
King Foundation, and the King Foundation asserted its own claims against Yeckel, the other
former directors, and Vett, and was realigned as a co-plaintiff with the Texas Attorney General.
Ultimately, settlements were reached with most of the other directors and a trial on the claims
against Yeckel and Vett ensued. The jury found Yeckel and Vett breached their fiduciary duties
to the King Foundation and received excessive compensation for their services. Yeckel was
ordered to reimburse the King Foundation $5,286,946.76 and Vett was ordered to reimburse the
King Foundation $2,304,629.49. Additional punitive damages of $14 million awarded by the
jury were not upheld on appeal. 94 The King Foundation case is representative of situations in
which the failure of board members to properly exercise their duty of care by staying informed
and properly supervising creates an environment ripe for abuse by self-interested officers and
directors.
D.
Proposed Legislation. The Texas Legislature is currently considering legislation
that would increase the enforcement power of the Texas Attorney General with respect to
charitable organizations. House Bill 2921 95 would amend the Texas Business Organizations
Code to provide:
If the attorney general has reason to believe that a nonprofit entity with a
charitable purpose is engaging in, has engaged in, or is about to engage in an
unlawful act or practice or that it would be in the public interest to conduct an
investigation to ascertain whether the entity is engaging in, has engaged in, or is about
to engage in an unlawful act or practice, the attorney general may:
(1) require an employee or agent of the entity to file on forms prescribed by the
attorney general a statement or report in writing, under oath or otherwise, as to all the
facts and circumstances concerning the alleged unlawful act or practice and other data
and information the attorney general considers necessary; and
(2) examine under oath any person in connection with the alleged unlawful act or
practice. 96
A similar amendment is proposed for the Texas Trust Code relating to charitable trusts.97
House Bill 2921 was recently reported favorably out of the State Affairs Committee on April 19,
2011 and may now be considered by the Texas House of Representatives. A similar Senate Bill
342 98 is currently pending for Senate committee action.
21
T E X A S T A X L A W Y E R – S PR I NG 2011

BACK TO TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

Terri Lynn Helge is an Associate Professor of Law at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law in Fort Worth,
Texas. David M. Rosenberg is with the law firm of Thompson & Knight L.L.P. in Dallas, Texas.
2
See, e.g., Chronicle of Philanthropy 2010 Executive Compensation Survey, available at http://philanthropy.com
(the Chronicle of Philanthropy’s annual survey lists the compensation and benefits paid to top executives of some
the nation’s largest charitable organizations and is not a representative sample of nonprofit executive compensation
generally); The Chronicle of Higher Education 2010 Executive Compensation Survey, available at
http://chronicle.com (The Chronicle of Higher Education’s annual survey lists the compensation and benefits of the
chief executive officers at hundreds of public and private institutions).
3
All references to the “Code” are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
4
Gen. Couns. Mem. 35855 (June 17, 1974). The U.S. Tax Court has also adopted this approach. McGahen v.
Comm’r, 76 T.C. 468, 482 (1981), aff'd, 720 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1983); Unitary Mission Church of Long Island v.
Comm’r, 74 T.C. 507 (1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981).
5
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c); see, e.g, South Health Ass’n v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 158, 188 (1978) (stating that the
private inurement prohibition has generally been applied to an organization’s founders or those in control of the
organization).
6
See, e.g., Texas Trade Sch. v. Comm’r, 30 T.C. 642 (1958) (holding that net earnings inured to insiders’ benefit
when the insiders leased property to an organization and caused it to make expensive improvements that would
remain after the lease expired); Rev. Rul. 67-4, 1967-1 C.B. 123 (holding that an organization did not qualify for tax
exemption because private inurement occurred when (i) the organization’s principal asset was stock in the insiders’
family-owned corporation, and (ii) the organization’s trustees failed to vote against the corporation’s issuance of a
new class of preferred stock, diluting the organization’s holdings); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9130002 (Mar. 19, 1991)
(concluding that private inurement occurred when a hospital sold a facility to a private entity controlled by insiders
for less than the fair market value).
7
I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(v).
8
I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(vi); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(2).
9
Private foundations are subject to a different excise tax regime on transactions with disqualified persons. See
I.R.C. § 4941. Section 4941 of the Code prohibits direct or indirect acts of “self dealing” between a private
foundation and those individuals or entities who are “disqualified persons” with respect to the foundation.
Typically, in considering whether a transaction between a private foundation and a disqualified person is an act of
self-dealing, it is immaterial whether the transaction results in a benefit or detriment to the foundation. Treas. Reg. §
53.4941(d)-1(a). However, a private foundation generally may pay reasonable compensation to a disqualified
person, including its officers and directors, without creating a prohibited act of self-dealing. The payment of
compensation to a disqualified person for services unrelated to carrying out the foundation’ s exempt purposes and
the payment of excessive compensation (or payment or reimbursement of excessive expenses) by a private
foundation to a disqualified person are prohibited acts of self-dealing. I.R.C.§ 4941(d)(2)(E).
10
I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1).
11
I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1).
12
I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2).
13
I.R.C. § 4958 (d)(2).
14
I.R.C. § 4958(f)(6). The Treasury Regulations contain specific procedures to correct certain excess benefit
transactions between a public charity and a disqualified person. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-7.
15
I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1).
16
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c).
17
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e).
18
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(2).
19
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(3).
20
Notice 2010-78, 2010-49 I.R.B. 808 (Oct. 28, 2010). Note that this is a different standard than the one used to
determine which individuals are “highly-compensated employees” for Form 990 reporting purposes.
21
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(d)(3).
22
Id.
23
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(i).
24
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(iii).
25
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(ii).
26
Id.
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27

Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(vi).
A charitable organization’s payment of premiums for liability insurance covering Section 4958 excise taxes or
indemnification of such taxes will not be an excess benefit if the premium or indemnification is included in the
disqualified person’s compensation when paid and the disqualified person’s total compensation is reasonable.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(B)(2).
29
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(B).
30
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(4).
31
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii).
32
Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949).
33
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii).
34
These general timing rules also apply to property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Therefore, if the
property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture satisfies the definition of fixed payment, reasonableness is
determined at the time the parties enter into the agreement providing for the transfer of the property. Treas. Reg. §
53.4958-4(b)(2)(i).
35
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(2)(i).
36
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(4) Example 2.
37
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(1).
38
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(3).
39
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(2).
40
I.R.C. § 4958(c)(4).
41
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(a) (withdrawn).
42
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(d) (withdrawn).
43
Non-fixed payments to a disqualified person not subject to a cap are generally not advisable. The Internal
Revenue Service will not presume any non-fixed payments to be reasonable until the amounts are determined.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(d). Therefore uncapped non-fixed payments are highly vulnerable to challenges as excess
benefit transactions or private inurement.
44
H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 56-57.
45
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1)-(3).
46
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(i)(A)-(C).
47
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(ii).
48
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1).
49
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(A)-(E).
50
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i). For organizations with annual gross receipts of less than $1 million, the
authorized body will be considered to have appropriate data as to comparability if it has compensation data of three
comparable organizations in the same or similar communities for similar services. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii).
51
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i)(A)-(D), (ii).
52
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii).
53
Report on Exempt Organizations Executive Compensation Compliance Project – Parts I and II (March 2007),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/exec_comp_final.pdf.
54
The 18-page script from the Phone Forum is available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/may_17_final_script_exec_comp_phone_forum.pdf.
55
In fact, many of the proposed reforms contained in the discussion draft found their way into the Pension
Protection Act of 2006 (the “PPA”), which was enacted in August 2006. While compensation reforms were not
contained in the PPA, then-serving Senate Finance Committee Chairman Grassley indicated that the PPA was only
the first of proposed legislative reforms for the charitable community and that more should be expected.
56
Available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/Report/final/Index.html.
57
Available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/Report/principles/Principles_Guide.pdf.
58
I.R.C. § 509(a)(3).
59
Proposed regulations issued on September 24, 2009 provide an integral part test to determine whether a Type III
supporting organization qualifies as a functionally integrated Type III supporting organization. See Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(4). A Type III supporting organization satisfies this integral part test if it either (1) serves as the
parent of each of its supported organizations or (2) engages in activities (i) substantially all of which directly further
the exempt purposes of its supported organizations, by performing the functions of, or carrying out the purposes of,
28
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such supported organizations, and (ii) that, but for the involvement of the supporting organization, would normally
be engaged in by its supported organizations. Id.
60
I.R.C. § 4943(f)(5)(B). As the Joint Committee on Taxation explains:
The current such regulation is Treasury regulation section 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(ii). Under Treasury
regulation section 1.509(a)-4(i)(3), the integral part test of current law may be satisfied in one of two
ways, one of which requires a payout of substantially all of an organization’s income to or for the use
of one or more publicly supported organizations, and one of which does not require such a payout.
There is concern that the current income-based payout does not result in a significant amount being
paid to charity if assets held by a supporting organization produce little to no income, especially in
relation to the value of the assets held by the organization, and as compared to amounts paid out by
nonoperating private foundations. There also is concern that the current regulatory standards for
satisfying the integral part test not by reason of a payout are not sufficiently stringent to ensure that
there is a sufficient nexus between the supporting and supported organizations. In revising the
regulations, the Secretary has the discretion to determine whether it is appropriate to impose a payout
requirement on any or all organizations not currently required to pay out. It is intended that, in
revisiting the current regulations, if the distinction between Type III supporting organizations that are
required to pay out and those that are not required to pay out is retained, which may be appropriate, the
Secretary nonetheless shall strengthen the standard for qualification as an organization that is not
required to pay out. For example, as one requirement, the Secretary may consider whether substantially
all of the activities of such an organization should be activities in direct furtherance of the functions or
purposes of supported organizations.
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of
2006,” JCX-38-06 (Aug. 3, 2006) at 360, n. 571.
61
Pub. L. No. 109-280 (2006).
62
I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(D).
63
The term “other similar payment” is not intended to include a payment pursuant to a bona fide sale or lease of
property. Such payments are instead subject to the general rules of Section 4958 if the substantial contributor meets
the definition of a “disqualified person.” Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of
H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06 (Aug. 3, 2006) at 358.
64
I.R.C. § 4958(c)(3).
65
Id.
66
I.R.C. § 4966(d)(1).
67
A fund or account of a Sponsoring Organization which pools contributions of multiple donors generally will not
meet the first prong of the definition of “donor advised fund” unless the contributions of specific donors are in some
way tracked and accounted for within the fund. Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical
Explanation of H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06 (Aug. 3, 2006) at 342-43.
68
This requirement is satisfied only if the expectation of advisory privileges is by reason of the donor’s status as
donor, and not solely by reason of the donor’s service to the Sponsoring Organization, such as by reason of the
donor’s position as an officer, employee or director of the Sponsoring Organization. Staff of the Joint Comm. on
Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06 (Aug. 3,
2006) at 344.
69
I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2).
70
I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2)(B)(ii).
71
I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2)(B)(i).
72
Notice 2006-109, 2006-51 I.R.B. 1121.
73
I.R.C. § 4966(d)(3).
74
I.R.C. § 4966(d)(4).
75
I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(D) and (E).
76
The term “other similar payment” is not intended to include a payment pursuant to a bona fide sale or lease of
property. Such payments are instead subject to the general rules of Section 4958. Staff of the Joint Comm. on
Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06 (Aug. 3,
2006) at 347.
77
I.R.C. § 4958(c)(2).
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78

Although there is no statutory definition of “incidental benefit,” the Joint Committee on Taxation’s interpretation
of this provision states that there is only an incidental benefit if, as a result of a distribution from a Donor Advised
Fund, a donor, donor advisor or related person, receives a benefit that would have reduced a charitable contribution
deduction if the benefit was received as part of the contribution to the Sponsoring Organization. Staff of the Joint
Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 2006,” JCX-38-06
(Aug. 3, 2006) at 350.
79
I.R.C. § 4967(a)(1).
80
I.R.C. § 4967(a)(2).
81
I.R.C. § 4967(b).
82
The $10,000 reporting threshold for other employee benefits and compensation paid by related organizations
applies only to compensation reported in Part VII. These items are also required to be reported on Schedule J,
regardless of amount. Accordingly, the amounts reported on Schedule J may exceed the amount of compensation
reported in Part VII for the same person.
83
Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.054.
84
Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.204(a).
85
See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.232(b).
86
See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.221(a).
87
See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.221.
88
See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 3.102.
89
See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.225. In addition, loans to officers of a nonprofit corporation are prohibited unless
the loan is “(1) made for the purposes of financing the officer’s principal residence; or (2) set in an original principal
amount that does not exceed: (A) 100 percent of the officer’s annual salary, if the loan is made before the first
anniversary of the officer’s employment; or (B) 50 percent of the officer’s annual salary, if the loan is made in any
subsequent year.” Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.055(b).
90
See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.230. Note that the procedure under Texas law for interested director transactions is
not as stringent at the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness procedure for transactions with disqualified persons
under Section 4958 of the Code.
91
See Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 7.001(b).
92
See Tex. Bus. Org. Code §7.001(c).
93
See Yeckel v. Abbott, No. 03-04-00713-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3881 (Tex. App. – Austin June 4, 2009, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
94
Id.
95
Tex. H.B. 2921, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Tex. S.B. 342, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011).
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